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ABSTRACT
Computer users are generally authenticated by means of a pass-
word. Unfortunately passwords are often forgotten and replace-
ment is expensive and inconvenient. Some people write their pass-
words down but these records can easily be lost or stolen. The
option we explore is to find a way to cue passwords securely. The
specific cueing technique we report on in this paper employs im-
ages as cues. The idea is to elicit textual descriptions of the images,
which can then be used as passwords.
We have defined a set of metrics for the kind of image that could
function effectively as a password cue. We identified five candidate
image types and ran an experiment to identify the image class with
the best performance in terms of the defined metrics.
The first experiment identified inkblot-type images as being su-
perior. We tested this image, called a cueblot, in a real-life environ-
ment. We allowed users to tailor their cueblot until they felt they
could describe it, and they then entered a description of the cueblot
as their password. The cueblot was displayed at each subsequent
authentication attempt to “cue” the password. Unfortunately, we
found that users did not exploit the cueing potential of the cueblot,
and while there were a few differences between textual descriptions
of cueblots and non-cued passwords, they were not compelling.
Hence our attempts to alleviate the difficulties people experience
with passwords, by giving them access to a tailored cue, did not
have the desired effect. We have to conclude that the password
mechanism might well be unable to benefit from bolstering activi-
ties such as this one.
1. INTRODUCTION
Computer users of the 21st century cannot escape the need to au-
thenticate themselves. This is mostly achieved by means of a secret
password. Since people use a multitude of systems, people have to
remember passwords for each of these. Since human memory is
fallible, the direct consequence of this is that people forget their
passwords, and need to have reminders or replacements.
In this paper we address the issue of password cueing. This term
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may seem to be an oxymoron since passwords are a security tool,
intended to protect some data or service, and need to remain secret
at all times. Cues, if at all clear and helpful, would tear a large hole
in the security ostensibly maintained by the password.
We do, however, believe that cues could be provided in the form
of an abstract image so that the cue itself is so obscure and vague
that it acts as a cue only to the legitimate owner of the password.
The cue acts only as a cue and not as a hint which could lead a
potential imposter to the password. Obviously the kind of image
used is critical, and we have therefore conducted an experiment to
test different kinds of images to determine which is the most viable.
We then used the resulting images in a real-life setting in order to
determine their efficacy and usefulness to the end-user.
In Section 2 secret-based authentication is reviewed. In Section
3 we provide a brief overview of the literature related to forgetting
and cueing. In Section 4, we motivate the use of images as cues and
explore the kinds of images that could be used in terms of memo-
rability and diversity of text associations. Section 4.3 provides a
synopsis of the previous sections and formulates the research ques-
tion. Section 5 gives information about the methodology followed
in order to find the best cueing image. Section 6 presents the results
of the experiment and Section 7 presents the results and identifies
the best image type. Section 8 reports on the experiment that tested
the use of the best image type as a cue during authentication. Sec-
tion 9 concludes.
2. AUTHENTICATION
In order to grant access to a restricted digital space, we use a two
phase protocol: identification followed by authentication. Users are
identified by means of a text string — either an email address or a
special user name — and then authenticated to verify the identity.
During authentication the user’s identity can be verified by means
of a shared secret, called a key, or by means of a biometric which
measures the user’s physiology or behaviour and matches it to a
previously recorded template. Since biometric measuring devices
are more expensive than keyboards most authentication these days
is done by means of a shared secret password.
There is nothing inherently wrong with this — but in the face
of fallible human memory and insecure communication channels it
tends to fail. The undeniable fact is that people often forget their
keys and these have to be replaced [1]. Unfortunately, there are
some problems with current replacement practices:
1. The replacement process weakens the mechanism because a
replacement key has to be delivered in some way and this
delivery can be intercepted by an intruder who then proceeds
to impersonate the legitimate user. If challenge questions are
used the mechanism is weakened unacceptably, as we shall
discuss in the following section.
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2. The replacement has to be funded and the cost is anything
but negligible. Gartner [1] claims that a single replacement
costs between $15 and $30. They estimate that each em-
ployee will call about 5 times a year (since they have pass-
words for multiple systems). A cheap alternative is simply
to send people their passwords by email, but since email is
seldom encrypted, this option can only be used for insecure
systems, and only where people haven’t forgotten their email
password.
What we need to do, therefore, is to devise a way to help users to
remember their passwords. The traditional way is by means of a
physical record but this is extremely insecure and should be dis-
couraged.
Since forgetting is the “fly in the ointment”, the next section
takes a closer look at this human propensity.
3. FORGETTING
Humans learn in two ways — explicitly and implicitly. Implic-
itly learnt skills seldom decay but explicitly learnt knowledge, the
category passwords belong to, is extremely prone to decay. Un-
fortunately humans do forget their passwords, and the forgetting
is seldom deliberate. Ebbinghaus [2] proposed a forgetting curve,
which predicts that most forgetting occurs early on in the process
and then slows down later on. Thus details may be forgotten within
minutes if no serious attempt is made to encode the information in
more than a cursory fashion.
Consider, now, how most passwords are chosen. Someone visits
a website and is asked to provide a password, which is to be used
at future visits for authentication purposes. The person’s goal is to
peruse the website, or purchase some items, or perhaps something
else — but whatever it is, the definition of the password is probably
extraneous to the person’s immediate goals and purposes. If the
person has had experiences of forgotten passwords in the past, a
well-worn password that is used for this kind of eventuality might
be provided. If there is a concern about security and the user is
wary of using a previously-used password, she/he may provide a
unique password and write it down. If, however, no record is made,
the password is likely to be forgotten, especially if the site is used
infrequently. Since people tend to rely on their memory to retain
passwords [3], this is the most likely scenario.
Schacter [4] calls this forgetting the sin of transience. Researchers
and practitioners have tried to come up with ways of improving
memory. Schacter cites a number of memory improvement pro-
grams and health cures and concludes that none are miracle cures.
One thing that does assist effective retrieval of remembered facts is
the effectiveness of the encoding process. Schacter cites research
into a mechanism called elaborative encoding where the person
spends some time encoding the information using visual imagery,
mnemonics or elaborative questions. These are indeed effective
but, of course, require extra effort and are unlikely to be used in
an uncontrolled password defining setting. Experience shows that
password users seldom take this trouble [3].
Another way of improving retrieval is by the provision of cues.
Nyberg et al. [5] argues that retrieval of information activates the
same brain regions as those activated when the information was
encoded. They experimented with word-sound encoding and found
that provision of the sounds assisted word retrieval. Moscovitch
and Craik [6] found that cueing was beneficial at deeper levels
of encoding. The following section considers cueing mechanisms
with emphasis on their use in an authentication context.
3.1 Cueing Mechanisms
A cue can be defined as:
a. A reminder or prompting, or
b. A hint or suggestion.
A cue heard by someone other than the person for whom it is
intended, therefore, could produce the same association or act as
the same reminder as it was intended to elicit in the target person
— especially if the cue is effective. In an authentication setting
such a universal cue is useless since it undermines the security of
the authentication key. Thus a cue used in an authentication setting
needs to be deliberately obtuse. It should make sense only to the
legitimate user, and not to anyone else.
One of the most common mechanisms, used by a variety of web-
sites, is that of challenge questions. On the face of it this is a viable
mechanism for proving identity when passwords are forgotten. A
closer look at challenge questions reveals many flaws. One has two
choices in posing questions — either the user chooses his or her
own questions at enrollment, and provides the answers, or the sys-
tem has a set of questions, and the user is allowed to choose one,
and provide the answer. Both options have problems:
• If the user has to generate the question he or she/he is equally
likely to forget the question as the password. In this case
the cue question places an extra demand on the user’s mem-
ory and is equally vulnerable to decay. One also has to put
software in place to ensure that users specify reasonable and
well-formed questions and do not simply enter their own
password as the question, for example.
• If the system has a set group of questions these need to be ap-
plicable to a wide range of users. Thus the site owners resort
to setting widely applicable questions based on, for example,
the name of the person’s first school, first pet or mother’s
maiden name. The fatal flaw with these questions is that a
relatively superficial knowledge of the legitimate user is re-
quired in order to know the answers to these questions, and
the challenge questions thus offer an intruder a convenient
and insecure way into the system. Even if the answer to the
chosen question is not easily determined using research, the
fact that most sites revert to the same set of questions reduces
the “secrecy” of the answer. The more sites holding the an-
swers the less secret they are.
Other sites prefer not to make use of challenge questions and revert
to emailing forgotten passwords to users. This is also an insecure
practice because email is seldom encrypted and is easily intercepted
by a hacker. The use of one-time passwords, which require chang-
ing as soon as the person logs in, is somewhat more secure, but
only if it is indeed the legitimate user who is trying to gain access.
If an intruder is requesting the password reminder, and watching
for the email, the legitimate user will probably be completely un-
aware of the intrusion into his account until the negative effects of
the intrusion manifest themselves.
Since email reminders and challenge questions are insecure and
ineffective we should attempt to find some other mechanism of re-
minding users of their forgotten passwords. One way of doing this
is by providing the user with a cue, as has been done by Hertzum
[7]. He proposes that users specify particular password charac-
ters which will be displayed at password entry in order to jog their
memory. This idea was tested with 14 users and it was found that it
did help them to remember their passwords. Hertzum notes, how-
ever, that the defined passwords were often weak and predictable
and argues that some kind of cueing mechanism is required in or-
der to support the use of longer and stronger passwords.
The possibility we have explored is the use of images as cues.
There is strong evidence that pictures are more memorable than
words. This commonly known picture superiority effect claims that
images are stored with names, or labels, associated with them [8],
which enhances memorability. The idea for our research is that the
user is given a personal image at enrollment and that the password
would essentially be the image description or name. The user can
then request the image to display as a password reminder should
she/he forget the password. A purely representational image will
not work in this secure context because what one really needs is
an image that elicits a different textual association from different
users so that intruders cannot confidently guess textual associations
within the three strikes allowed before a lockout.
Stubblefield and Simon [9] experimented with using inkblots to
assist users to form a semantic association with the textual pass-
word, which could be used as a reminder mechanism as required.
They displayed 10 inkblots in a particular sequence. For each blot
the user was required to enter two characters — the starting and
ending character of their inkblot description. They had some suc-
cess in trials of this mechanism, achieving an entropy of 4.09 bits
per character. However, the cognitive load imposed on the user is
significant. They do not merely provide a textual description; they
have to parse it in their minds to extract the required starting and
ending character, and then type that in. Stubblefield and Simon
do not give demographic information about their experimental sub-
jects but one can envisage this cognitive load being untenable for
any but the most mentally agile of users.
There is evidence, however, that passwords based on associative
memory are more memorable but harder for people to guess [10].
In addition to Stubblefield and Simon’s proposal outlined above,
associative passwords have been trialled for sound clips [11] and
for other words [12, 10]. Sound associations were not particularly
successful they tested the association between sound and an im-
age. The system was evaluated by a group of students in a lab,
which made the sound problematical. In the end the students sim-
ply memorised the pictures and did not use the sound to cue the
pictures. Word association works well, but is very time consuming,
both at enrolment and authentication.
Our hypothesis is that we could make use of images as direct
cues, without the intermediate processing required by Stubblefield
and Simon. We therefore need to determine what kind of image
could support this cueing activity in an authentication setting. We
need to find out what characteristics this image would have to ex-
hibit to facilitate superior recall in the authentication context. The
image descriptions would also have to be more durable than ran-
dom textual passwords in order to improve the current situation.
Von Ahn and Dabbish [13] did research which relied on simi-
lar skills, but for a different purpose. They constructed a game,
which required people to label images, all the while attempting to
guess at the labels other game players have used to describe the im-
age. Since their main purpose is to find commonly used descriptive
labels for images, the research is different from ours. Our main
purpose is to identify an image type which will elicit very different
descriptions from different people.
We conducted a series of experiments in order empirically to ver-
ify the use of images in this context. Before discussing our experi-
ments, we need first to discuss different image types and the effects
of human vision on the image choice.
4. HUMAN VISION
One of the most vital of the human senses is vision. When an
object is seen, the viewer will compare that object to an internal
“database” of objects within his or her mind, and use past expe-
rience to match that object with the object being seen in order to
identify it. Thus visual perception interacts with perceptual pro-
cesses but also with memory, reasoning and communication [14].
This research considers the use of images as cues. In order to act
as a cue in an authentication environment, the image must have the
following characteristics:
1. Ambiguity — The image cue should mean different things to
different people. Thus a straightforward representational im-
age is unsuitable if the users share a common language since
the description of the image is likely to be similar. Hence we
need some kind of ambiguous image to act as a cue. An am-
biguous image is interpreted differently by different people,
according to the individual’s particular perceptual processes
and past experiences of the world.
Hence if we can identify this kind of image, a specific user’s
cue will not necessarily be useful to an intruder.
2. Efficacy — Human memory for pictures and their textual de-
scription needs to be superior to word memory so that the
cueing mechanism is meaningful and excites a durable as-
sociation. Furthermore, the textual description needs to be
strong enough to act as a password.
The following two sections address these concepts in greater de-
tail.
4.1 Ambiguity
A group of psychologists called the Gestalt psychologists have
formulated a set of laws of organisation that help us understand
the perceptual filling-in process. The laws relate to [15]: Closure,
Good Continuation, Proximity, Similarity, Relative Size, Surround-
edness, Orientation and Symmetry and Common Fate. To achieve
ambiguity in the authentication context we need to find images that
are sufficiently vague in terms of the Gestalt laws so that they will
lead to multiple interpretations.
There is a category of images called “Ambiguous Images”. Bruce
and Green [15] give some examples of pictures that depict differ-
ent things depending on foreground/background ambiguity. They
point out that humans see either the one or the other, but not both
at the same time. These pictures have deliberately been made am-
biguous and do not serve our purposes very well since they usually
have only two possible interpretations. The first question we need
to ask, in choosing images for this research, is how humans make
sense of images that are not obviously representations of a particu-
lar object.
We therefore need a way to describe different candidate image
types so that we can arrive at a particular description of an effica-
cious image type that can act as a cue. Alario and Ferrand [16] have
classified a number of images and propose the following norms to
describe them:
• Name agreement — the degree to which the people agree on
the name of the picture;
• Image agreement — the degree to which the person’s mental
image matches the picture;
• Familiarity — the familiarity of the concept being depicted;
• Visual complexity — measuring the number of lines and de-
tails in the picture;
• Image variability — indication of whether the name of an
object invokes many or few images for the object.
These norms will be used in later sections to delineate the kinds
of images the cueing application requires. Broadly speaking, we
can use them to identify the best image genre for cueing purposes.
Obviously representative images will have high name agreement
and this disqualifies them. We are therefore left with the broad
class of abstract images — images not directly representing a real
object. Within this class of images we need to identify particular
classes that are sufficiently vague in terms of the Gestalt laws to
make them abstract but not so vague that they are impossible to
name. If we are able to identify such an image class, our next
concern is the efficacy of the textual description a particular image
member of that class will elicit, in terms of acting as a password
cue.
In addition to abstract images, we decided to include a special
image type ie. human faces, in our experiment. The face is a spe-
cial image as far as humans are concerned. Each face has the same
configuration and elements and yet humans are able to identify
thousands of faces without any difficulty. There is disagreement
amongst researchers about whether faces are processed as a unit or
in terms of component features [17]. Smith and Nielsen [18] argue
for a two-phase recognition process — a holistic processing phase
followed by a process which does a feature by feature comparison.
Dodson et al. [19] found that when people were required to come
up with a description of facial features it impaired their ability to
recognise the face at a later time. It seems reasonable to conclude
that forcing people to describe individual components or features
of faces is detrimental to the memory encoding process. On the
other hand, Bower and Carlin [20] found that if people were asked
to attribute intelligence to different faces, they remembered the face
better later on. This is perhaps because the process of attributing
semantic codes to the faces requires additional processing and this
helps to encode the face in the person’s memory whereas the previ-
ous study considered features in isolation and “whole face” encod-
ing was not encouraged or facilitated. We have included faces in
our study to see whether the textual descriptions people ascribe to
faces meet our requirements.
4.2 Efficacy
In order to determine viability of a particular image class as a
cueing mechanism, we need a way to judge the efficacy of textual
descriptions of members of the different image classes. This effi-
cacy encompasses more than one aspect:
1. Descriptiveness — Humans should have the ability to de-
scribe the pictures in a textual format — this is termed pic-
ture naming.
2. Strength — The text association, in order to qualify as a
strong password, needs to have either length or complexity,
which make it harder to break.
3. Memorability & Durability — Human memory for pictures
needs to be superior to word memory so that the cueing mech-
anism is meaningful. However, even more importantly, the
text association should be durable in the sense that users are
able to reproduce it perfectly after a time lapse.
We now present a summary of the literature in each of these areas.
4.2.1 Descriptiveness
Humans communicate by naming objects, a skill that is as effort-
less as it is essential to speech. The central premise of this research
has been that we can rely on the previously-mentioned picture su-
periority effect accompanied by reliably retained textual descrip-
tions.Levelt et al. [21] present a processing model of the picture
naming task, which includes the following steps:
1. Recognition of the visual object.
2. The person now searches through his or her internal memory
structures to find a match for the object.
3. During the following stage a selection is made from the in-
ternal structures.
4. Next there must be another matching process — where the
internal structure is matched to a word representation.
5. Now, what Levelt calls syllabic gestural scores are derived.
This converts the chosen word’s phonological shape into syl-
lables that can be articulated.
6. Articulation can only occur once all the previous stages have
completed.
7. Self-monitoring. Speakers can determine, during this stage,
whether there has been an error, and self-repair.
The textual description attribution process requires the user to
enter the description via the keyboard, so that the last two stages
of the picture naming process given above will be replaced by pro-
cesses attuned to writing and not to speaking. The self-monitoring
stage is inappropriate in this setting since passwords are not echoed
to the user due to security constraints. Bonin et al. [22] state that
researchers are not agreed as to whether the phonological stage is
involved in the production of writing [23, 24] or whether the or-
thographical codes can be accessed directly [25, 26] (both sets of
researchers referenced by Bonin et al.). Bonin’s research has con-
firmed that speaking and writing share processing levels but that
each also has a relative degree of autonomy.
For the purposes of this discussion we can probably ignore these
differences between spoken and written picture naming. What is
important, in the context of cueing by means of abstract image, is
that the above process will be augmented since the abstract image
is more expressive than a representative image, and does not have a
simple label, but requires the person to use specific perceptual and
cognitive processes in order to interpret, identify and verbalise what
he or she sees in the image and to produce a textual description. For
example, consider the process involved in assigning a name to one
of the most famous images: inkblots. Rapaport [27], referring to
the Rorschach inkblot verbalisation process, argues that such a pro-
cess is an “association process initiated by the inkblots as stimuli”
(p91). The results of the association process need to be converted
to language, and this process is highly dependent on individual fac-
tors [28]. Hence even if two people perceive a particular image as
belonging to the same semantic class they are likely to verbalise
it in slightly different ways. We hope that these individual differ-
ences will lead to syntactically different picture descriptions and
therefore distinctly different passwords.
4.2.2 Strength
In order to use an image as a cue, we need to consider the security
aspects of the image. Passwords are generally broken in one of two
ways if there is no cue: brute strength or dictionary attack. The
former simply works its way through all possible permutations until
it finds a match. The latter exploits the fact that most people will
use a recognisable word in their own language and works its way
through dictionaries until a match is found. The latter approach
is by far the most popular because passwords can often be broken
within a matter of minutes using this technique whereas brute force
is extremely time consuming. For example, in 2006 some hackers
managed to get hold of a number of MySpace passwords. Security
expert Bruce Schneier [29] analysed the passwords and found that
the top three most used passwords were password1, abc123 and
myspace1.
Hence, to make it harder for a dictionary attack to succeed we
need to make the password less susceptible to this kind of attack.
There are two ways of doing this — either by making the password
longer by using more than one word or by making it more complex
by including numeric and other special characters.
The latter approach has severe memorability limitations and the
technique of replacing of vowels with numbers, such as using a
3 instead of an e, is so well known by attackers as to be almost
useless. Recent studies have found that it is easier for observers
to gain knowledge of this kind of password because it is harder to
type in than if the user is typing in a familiar word [30]. Making the
password longer, then, appears to be the most beneficial approach.
Since we’re asking people to describe non-representational im-
ages, we would expect to see longer passwords, which will con-
tribute towards strength. Furthermore, there is evidence that previ-
ously seen pictures are named faster than new pictures [31]. Hence
by timing responses a system may be able to infer that a possi-
ble intrusion attempt is underway. Since abstract images may well
initiate the same semantic association in the legitimate user and
the intruder, but a slightly different syntactical conversion is pro-
duced, the best way to prevent an intruder from trying different
possible descriptions until he or she succeeds is by judicious use of
the “three tries lockout” policy.
4.2.3 Memorability & Durability
The picture superiority effect states that humans remember pic-
tures better and for longer than words. Psychologists have demon-
strated this with a number of experiments [32, 33, 34]. Research
on advertising has shown that recall of pictures is high even after
as little as a 10 or 30 second exposure. Singh et al. [35] found that
after 6 weeks people retained almost half the products and a third
of the claims after only two 30 second exposures. To explain this
effect Paivio proposes a dual coding theory. This theory proposes
that humans remember both a visual and verbal code for images,
and that this eases retrieval since there are two pathways available
and each provides a pathway to the other. Nelson [36] suggests that
pictures are described in a richer more detailed fashion in memory
and it is this that leads to superior retention. Whatever the reason,
there is a solid body of evidence that humans, having seen an image
once, will readily be able to attest to the fact, and that this effect is
stronger than word-related memory effects.
That said, it must be borne in mind that all these experiments
have tested recognition memory whereas the use of cueing images
requires the use of recall memory. Recognition relies on the per-
son identifying a previously-seen picture, usually from a group of
pictures. Recall requires the person to re-generate the name of
a previously-seen picture. There is some evidence, however, that
people recall picture names for a long time. Cave [37] found that a
single exposure to a picture could be detected even after 48 weeks
by examining naming response times at subsequent exposure to the
image. An interesting effect was observed by MacLeod [38], who
studied the re-learning effect. He tested the memory of pictures in
terms of recall (where subjects had to recall the name of the pic-
ture) and in terms of recognition (where subjects had to identify
the previously-seen picture). He determined that there is a savings
effect for pictures when a recall acquisition process was used, but
not when a recognition acquisition process was used. The savings
effect is an effect whereby people are unaware that the knowledge
is available to them until they try to relearn something. The vastly
shortened acquisition time is a result of the previous learning.
This research does not rely on recognition, but rather on recall,
and the savings effect should therefore be active. The use of images
in this study requires the user to study the image and to describe it
— a fairly cognitively intensive process. Our expectation is that the
details will be recalled even after a time lapse.
4.3 Summary
We have enumerated two characteristics images need to exhibit
in order to use them for cueing: ambiguity and efficacy. In order to
satisfy the first requirement we tested a number of abstract image
classes, classes of images that elicit no immediate association with
any real life object, and the face class, which has proven memora-
bility. We tested a number of images from each of of these image
classes in order to determine efficacy of the class, by analysing and
testing the following:
1. Descriptiveness — to what extent is it possible for people to
assign a name to the image? This will, to some extent, be
assisted by the adherence of the abstract image to the Gestalt
laws. In terms of Alario and Ferrand’s norms, we need high
visual complexity.
2. Strength — measured in terms of length of the description,
the character distribution of the responses, and the entropy
of the description. We also need to test for low name agree-
ment and high image variability, which tests whether differ-
ent people provide the same names for the image or whether
descriptions differ.
3. Memorability & Durability — How durable are the image
text associations? In order to determine this we will conduct
an experiment to test the memorability of image descriptions.
Memorability is directly related to high image agreement —
a stronger single mental image will lead to higher likelihood
of the user remembering the image description than many
mental images for the same abstract image..
We investigated this by means of an experiment which compared
the different abstract image types in terms of convergence of image
descriptions (to measure descriptiveness and strength). The experi-
ment is described in the following section. We tested the durability
of the textual descriptions of the best performing image in a further
experiment, which is described in Section 8.
5. TESTING DIFFERENT IMAGE TYPES
The most suitable images for testing, which meet the require-
ments laid down in Section 4, are those that exhibit the required
level of vagueness in terms of the Gestalt laws [39] discussed in
Section 4.1, on the one hand. We will also be using faces because
of their proven memorability.
As explained in Section 4.3, we require images that have low
name agreement, high image agreement, are visually complex and
those for which it is possible to come up with a memorable textual
description. Our Images are shown in Appendix A. The relation-
ship between the image classes and the Gestalt laws is shown in
Table 1.
• Faces — Humans are famously good at remembering faces.
The reasons for this are debated by learned researchers. Some
believe that the human brain has a special ability to recog-
nise faces [40] but others believe that it is a skill we are good
at because we spend a great deal of our lives doing it [41].
Whatever the reason, the fact remains that humans are good
at recognising previously-seen faces. Whereas memorabil-
ity is clearly not an issue, durability might well be. Chance
and Goldstein [42] conducted an experiment to determine
whether previously assigned verbal labels would be recalled
after a time lapse. They found performance in recalling ver-
bal labels to be weak and unreliable with only 35% of verbal
labels being recalled correctly. However, despite this we in-
cluded faces to see whether our experience replicates theirs.
• Fractals — Singh [43] quotes Works as saying that frac-
tals are appealing to humans due to their innate aestheticism.
This makes the fractal a good candidate for our research but
their suitability for cueing remains to be seen.
• Inkblots — Stubblefield and Simon [9] used inkblots, and
gained good preliminary results. The most famous user of
inkblots was Rorschach [44]. He thought that the responses
to his inkblots could be used to assess personality. This par-
ticular test is no longer given much credibility [45] but the
technique for eliciting variable responses could work very
well in our context.
• Snowflakes — Snowflakes were used by Goldstein and Chance
[46] as part of a larger experiment measuring recognition
ability but no work has been performed to study users’ de-
scriptions of these images.
• Textures — The Texture image type was chosen because of
their intrinsic variety. Textures can have smooth or rough,
coarse or fine as well as having regular or irregular patterns.
We obtained our experimental images from multiple sources.
Our human faces were chosen from the Essex Face Database[47]
to obtain an equal balance of gender in good lighting conditions
on plain backgrounds. A commercial toolset[48] was used to gen-
erate the fractal images. Inkblots were generated using a custom
parameterised script we developed to control the distribution of
blots within the image. Snowflakes were generated using a free
Snowflake generator tool[49]. Textures were chosen from the CuReT
[50] texture database to comprise of both artificial and natural ob-
jects with varying degrees of lighting conditions and smoothness
of the texture. Generated images were chosen by varying param-
eters which resulted in images which were distinctly different in
appearance.
We developed a web-based application to present participants
with the images shown in Appendix A so that they could provide
a textual association for each. We allowed users the option of not
submitting an association for a particular image if they found it
difficult to form an association. We collected all associations and
performed an analysis, which is reported in the following Section.
6. RESULTS
We first consider the response rate for images in terms of the
number of responses gathered for particular images. The user could
choose not to provide an association for an image and this act of
not responding to an image was taken as an indication that the user
found the image too difficult to generate a textual association for.
As such, this serves as an implicit subjective measure related to the
ease of forming an association from a particular image or image
class. In this section we refer to image n where n is the image
presented in Appendix A.
6.1 Descriptiveness
We wanted to determine the likelihood of participants assigning
a textual description to each image type in order to measure the ease
of descriptiveness of the image type. Each of the 49 users in this
experiment were presented with 30 images, 6 of each image class,
and prompted to enter a description. We gathered 1355 non-null
responses (Faces: 278, Fractals: 272, Inkblots: 270, Snowflakes:
257, Textures: 278). The textual descriptions assigned to image 14
give a good example of the range of responses we obtained: but-
teroad, demented frog, mangled butterfly and angry clown, among
others.
We found that there was a statistical difference in the number of
responses we received from users based on the image class, F(1.83,
535.4)=15.53, p < 0.05. The snowflake class had a significantly
lower rate of responses when compared to all other image classes
while the face and texture classes had higher response rates. When
we compared the response rates of individual images we found that
there were no statistical differences within the image classes for any
particular images within their class, p > 0.05. This indicates that
faces and textures are the easiest image classes for users to form
associations with and that snowflakes are the most difficult. In the
following analyses we removed all null responses and considered
only responses collected as a result of successful picture naming.
6.2 Strength
If we want to use the image descriptions as cues, we have to
deal with the possibility of a guess being made as to the image
description generated by the legitimate user. A long description,
therefore, will not necessarily act as a strong password; one needs
to consider the entropy of the description and the variability of the
responses.
This section therefore considers the responses in terms of strength
from length (response length), image variability (character distribu-
tion and informational entropy) and name agreement (predictabil-
ity).
6.2.1 Response Length
The next measure that we consider is the average length of the
textual response obtained from an image measured in characters, in
order to determine the strength of the description if it were used
as a password. However, as we will show, since this does not
take into account the character set or probability distribution of
the character set it cannot be used to independently measure the
security of a password or textual association. It is, nonetheless, a
useful simple indicator of security. The results of this analysis are
presented in Figure 1 and can be summarised as Faces (M=16.6,
SE=0.83), Fractals (M=18.3, SE=1.1), Inkblots (M=18.3, SE=1.0),
Snowflakes (M=15.3, SE=0.7) and Textures (M=12.1, SE=0.5)
Figure 1: Response Length By Image Class
We can observe from these results that the response length is
Image Type Closure Continuity Proximity Similarity Symmetry
Faces
√ √ √
Fractals
√ √
Inkblot
√ √ √ √ √
Snowflakes
√ √ √ √ √
Textures
√ √ √ √
Table 1: Image Classes & the Gestalt Laws
significantly affected by the image class, F(3.6, 1000.5)=12.414,
p < 0.05. The length of the response is significantly shorter for
textures than for all other image classes. Furthermore, we found
that an extremely simple snowflake with few “rays” had signifi-
cantly lower response character length (M=13.02, SE=1.83) than
a comparable snowflake with many rays (M=19.1, SE=1.93) indi-
cating that overly simple images may result in simple responses,
F=(4.16,99.96)=2.85, p < 0.05. This shows that the type of image
shown to the user is important as different image classes can en-
courage users to provide the longer responses which are generally
desired for stronger passwords.
6.2.2 Image Variability
Character Distribution
The character distribution of the response is a security indicator
since it gives an idea of how predictable the responses are and how
easily an image description could be guessed. When we consid-
ered the character distribution of the responses we discovered that
they closely parallel that of English. This is unsurprising as all the
participants were English speakers and since all responses would
be in English, the responses would appear to inherit the character
distribution frequencies.
Informational Entropy
The informational entropy of responses gives us an indication of the
image variability of the image. The entropy of the information in a
signal, as defined by Shannon[51], specifies how much uncertainty
or “randomness” exists within the signal. Specifically
H(X) =−
n
∑
i=1
p(Xi)log2 p(Xi)
where H(X) is the entropy of the signal X in bits, Xi is a token in
the alphabet of X represented by 1..n and p(Xi) is the probability
function representing the probability that the token will appear in
the signal. The probability function used in this case is a simple
weight based on the character frequencies within the textual as-
sociation. As entropy within the signal increases it becomes less
predictable and, as such, the more difficult it becomes to guess the
content. Here we represent the entropy of a textual response by the
average number of bits required to encode each character using an
encoded string. For comparison; a standard ASCII keyboard has 95
printable characters (including the space character), this results in
an upper bound on textual entropy of 6.57 bits per character. The
lower bound for entropy is clearly 0 bits per character for a string
composed entirely of a single character; since the next character in
the string is always predictable. This entropic view of textual pass-
words essentially measures the extent of the usage of the available
character set.
The results of entropic analysis of the responses are summarised
as follows; Faces (M=3.1,SE=0.01), Fractals (M=3.1,SE=0.02),
Inkblots (M=3.1,SE=0.02), Snowflakes (M=3,SE=0.01)
and Textures (M=2.9,SE=0.01).
Figure 2: Bits per Character
From the results presented in Figure 2 we can see that the tex-
ture image class is the only class with a significant difference in
the number of bits per character, F=(4,1108)=5.49, p < 0.05. We
observed that the snowflake with the highest number of rays had
a significantly higher number of bits per character (Image 22: M
= 3.28, SE = 0.04) than three other snowflakes (Image 20: M =
2.93, SE = 0.002),(Image 21: M = 2.89, SE = 0.05),(Image 24:
M=2.93, SE=0.05), F(4.11,197.285)=4.083, p < 0.05. There were
significant effects between individual images within the textures
class which were caused by a single image, of a leaf (image 28),
which had a significantly lower number of bits per character (M
= 2.62, SE = 0.07). There were two textures with high amounts
of repetition which had higher than average bits per character for
the textures image class (Image 29: M=3.00, SE=0.06),(Image 30:
M=3.08, SE=0.04), F(3.753,180.12)=5.508, p < 0.05.
The number of bits per character is essentially the same for most
image classes (except textures) and the length of the response is
the largest contributor to the number of bits per response (ie. total
entropy) and therefore the overall security of a particular textual
association.
6.2.3 Name Agreement
We can measure name agreement using the Smith-Waterman[52]
algorithm to measure local optimal alignments between strings.
These alignments correspond to local similarities between strings
and are a useful measure in our case to locate instances where the
strings have similar sections — thus measuring the similarity be-
tween two strings. A heuristic approach was used to determine a
normalised score for each class of images normalised by response
length.
The analysis shows that the Smith-Waterman score is signifi-
cantly affected by the image class, F(1.79,496)=1487, p < 0.05.
The results show that inkblots have the lowest average Smith-Water-
man score (least similarity) followed by fractals, snowflakes, faces
and finally textures.
Analysis of the Smith-Waterman scores for individual images
reveals that within the faces class any images with distinctive fea-
tures (such as images 1 and 4) score higher (more similar) Smith-
Waterman scores as these features are more readily commented
upon within the user’s response, F(1.905,91.45)=36.567, p < 0.05.
Two highly symmetrical fractals (images 7 and 11) had signifi-
cantly higher Smith-Waterman scores than the other fractals,
F(1.725,85.62)=23.66, p < 0.05. There was a third symmetrical
image within the fractal class (image 12) that did not score simi-
larly so the reasons for these particularly high scores is unknown.
There was a significant decrease in Smith-Waterman scores for the
inkblots with high density distributions of blots (images 13, 14 and
17) as compared to the more evenly distributed inkblots (images 13,
14 and 17), F(1.74,83.52)=42.196, p < 0.05. The snowflakes class
exhibited significant differences in the Smith-Waterman scores,
F(1.53,73.565)=66.757, p < 0.05. The two least complex snow-
flakes (images 19 and 21) had significantly higher (more similar)
scores than all other snowflakes followed by the two most com-
plex images (images 20 and 24). Interestingly the lowest Smith-
Waterman scores were for images 22 and 23 which were generated
using either the maximum number of rays or the maximum com-
plexity but not both. The images within the texture class were also
found to have significantly higher Smith-Waterman scores for eas-
ily identifiable textures (images 28 and 29), F(1.268,60.878)=193.984,
p < 0.05.
In conclusion, the inkblot images scored best in terms of having
a low name agreement, followed by snowflakes while textures had
the highest level of name agreement.
7. DISCUSSION
When we examine the results from the previous section we dis-
cover that the Inkblot and Fractal classes are particularly good per-
formers for all metrics while Texture and Snowflake classes per-
form poorly (except for name agreement for the latter)
The bits per character for each image class was essentially the
same — indicating that response length was the primary factor
when determining the security of the image description. Hence for
the majority of our experiments there was no appreciable difference
between individual images within the image classes, whereas there
were many differences across class boundaries.
One explanation for the above findings is that the normal func-
tion of the visual system is to detect strong perceptual signals,
i.e. “recognise things” within retinal images comprising poten-
tially ambiguous combinations of visual elements set against, or
even partially obscured by, background clutter “distractors”. The
Gestalt laws indicate grouping mechanisms that have evolved to fa-
cilitate visual interpretation under the above conditions and thereby
improve the perceptual signal-to-noise, i.e. receiver operating char-
acteristic, for visual recognition. By constructing images that po-
tentially contain ambiguity in the arrangement of their visual el-
ements, we would appear to be able to elicit ambiguity in their
perceptual interpretation.
Therefore, by reducing the signal-to-noise ratio in perceptual
grouping space we can potentially increase the range of interpreta-
tions, and perhaps also their uniqueness as near random groupings
become associated in the mind of the perceiver, to contribute to
the security (unpredictability) of the elicited textual responses. The
reverse of the above argument is also true; images containing dis-
tinctive features that rise above the perceptual signal-to-noise, limit
the potential for ambiguity and thereby multiple interpretations, as
exhibited by the texture images containing highly distinctive ele-
ments.
On the one hand it would appear that we should generate a com-
binatorial explosion of potentially valid interpretations of the atomic
visual elements presented in each cue image. The most straightfor-
ward approach to achieving such a combinatorial power set would
appear to be, on first sight, to construct the cue images from a wide
variety of very small visual features, thereby maximising their po-
tential combinations. However, following this approach would lead
to fine texture-like fields being generated and we observed that the
text produced in response to texture fields is not as rich and unique
as that produced by inkblots or fractals. A potential explanation
is that texture fields are being interpreted as global homogeneous
visual percepts, e.g. classic texture fields might elicit descriptions
such as sand, water, pebbles etc, comprising simple unitary con-
cepts.
This observation of the effect of increasing visual complexity
beyond a certain threshold has been reported by Granovskaya et al.
[53]. Images beyond a threshold level of complexity appear to be
interpreted and memorised in terms of the statistical distribution of
atomic shapes from which they are constructed. Krienovich and
Longpre´ [54] have suggested that limited mental memory capacity
is responsible for this barrier to memorising highly complex images
accurately and have formalised this notion in terms of a modified
version of Kolmogorov complexity.
By generating visual elements over a range of spatial scales,
we are less likely to generate a homogeneous texture-like image
field and correspondingly more likely to elicit local interpretations
that contribute to a global percept representing a compound ob-
ject or scene with multiple elements, to elicit the richest responses.
Hence we should maximise use of our limited mental capacity for
visual complexity by generating cue images containing structure
and structural relations between elements, as opposed to low-level
disorder.
Fractals, by definition, are constructed from visual elements span-
ning a range of spatial scales and the inkblot generation mechanism
likewise produces and combines atomic visual elements, i.e. blots
of varying sizes. Therefore these mechanisms would appear to be
well suited to generating image fields that contain perceptually sig-
nificant local structure. While the snowflake images also contain
structures over a range of spatial scales, their regularity and sym-
metric configurations would appear to reduce their scope for mul-
tiple competing interpretations.
The experiments in Section 5 indicate that the elicited responses
are sufficiently secure to provide a viable cueing mechanism. Given
the above evidence it would appear that at least inkblots and fractals
have the potential to serve as password cues. Our last metric for cue
image efficacy is durability. To test durability and hence overall
efficacy in an authentication context, we used inkblots as cues in
a longitudinal experiment. The following section reports on our
findings about the viability of inkblot-like image cues, which we
have called cueblots, in eliciting strong passwords.
8. CUEBLOT AUTHENTICATION
In order to test the efficacy of cueblots we developed a website
for an elective module within our undergraduate computing sci-
ence course. The website gave students access to lecture notes,
their grades and various other resources. A total of 53 undergrad-
uate students used the website. Users were randomly assigned to
the password or cueblot conditions. The cueblot-assisted authenti-
cation process had the following phases:
1. Registration: users were given a user name and registration
code, by email, to facilitate the registration process. When
they entered the key, the system either allowed them to choose
a password (for the password condition), or displayed a cue-
blot, and allowed the user to customise and tailor the cueblot,
as illustrated in Figure 3, to their satisfaction. The user was
then instructed to give a cueblot description as a password.
The cueblots were comprised of 5 elements: (i) a randomly
selected seed, (ii) the maximum diameter of blots on the can-
vas, (iii) the number of blots on the canvas, (iv) the distance
between blots and (v) the number of colours in the cueblot.
When the user is happy with their choice of cueblot the sys-
tem simply saves these 5 parameters which can be used dur-
ing authentication to regenerate the cueblot. The users were
permitted to tailor the cueblot so as to ensure that they were
not presented with an cueblot that they found it impossible to
create a textual association for. If they were presented with
a cueblot they considered to be obscure, they could either re-
quest a brand new one or tailor that one until they felt they
were able to create an association.
2. Authentication: The users entered a user name and were the
directed to the authentication page. In the case of password
users a simple password text entry area was supplied. In the
case of cueblot users “their” cueblot was displayed and the
user could re-enter the original cueblot description.
3. Replacement: users could request a re-registration from the
website administrator by email if the password had been for-
gotten.
The experiment ran for 9 weeks and all accesses were logged
to facilitate analysis. The results are presented in the following
section.
8.1 Results
Of the users who had agreed to their login behaviour being mon-
itored, a total of 53 actually used the site. Of these, 24 were al-
located to the password condition and 29 to the cueblot condition.
One user from the password condition needed a password reset dur-
ing the course of the experiment and both the original and replace-
ment passwords are included in our analysis; no users in the cueblot
condition requested a replacement password.
We encountered six instances of people who deviated from the
instructions provided for their condition. Two password users used
the registration code as their password, probably because they had
an email record of this code, and this made things easier for them
if they forgot their password. Four people chose to ignore their
cueblot, declining the offered cue and instead providing a pass-
word or pass-phrase of their own choosing. Since this type of be-
haviour is entirely possible in real life deployments, we retained
these passwords/descriptions throughout our analysis. Examples of
passwords given by cueblot users are: scarypumpkin, bunnysplat,
blob, somethin and mask.
Authentication mechanisms, whether they make use of cues or
not, must try to maximise both security and ease of use. The next
two sections will consider our findings related to cueblot-assisted
authentication in terms of these perspectives.
8.2 Security
When discussing the security of an authentication scheme based
on textual input the first measure considered is typically the length
of the password and its character complexity. That is to say; longer
passwords with larger choices of available characters (i.e. lower-
case and uppercase letters, numbers and special characters instead
of just lowercase letters) will result in much more secure pass-
words.
Password Length
When we consider the length of the response for each condition
we find, surprisingly, that there is no significant difference between
passwords (M: 7.52, SE: 0.332) and cueblots (M: 8.31, SE: 0.632),
p > 0.05. Similarly when we evaluate the mean number of bits
required per character for passwords (M: 2.49, SE: 0.09) and cue-
blot descriptions (M: 2.64, SE: 0.11) we find that this, too, is not
significant, p > 0.05.
Password Guessability
The length and number of bits per character, however, do not tell
the full story. We also have to consider how similar descriptions
are to each other and to what extent they have similar substrings.
We used the Smith-Waterman algorithm[52], which is designed
to do local sequence alignment. This allows us to measure the
longest common sequences between strings (i.e. common uses
of words such as “ the ”), in this case a higher score indicates a
longer sequence and thus a lower score is desirable. We found that
cueblots (M: 0.08, SE: 0.005) had a significantly higher Smith-
Waterman score than passwords (M: 0.05, SE: 0.006), t(48.85) =
-4.088, p < 0.05, which indicates that users often include a larger
subset of common words within their cueblot descriptions than with
traditional passwords.
In the next section we will analyse the users’ performance at us-
ing cueblot-assisted authentication in the context of time and effort
required as well as login success rates.
8.3 Ease of Use
In this section we focus on the results gathered from our experi-
ment which give us an indication of the user’s experience of using
the cueblot system as compared to the traditional password system.
Registration
Users were were sent a registration code by email, which allowed
them to access the site. Although it is often glossed over, the regis-
tration process can play a vital role in forming the user’s initial per-
spective of the system. In our experimental system the password
condition was a simple password entry prompt in the traditional
style (users were asked to enter the password twice to confirm it’s
correctness). By comparison, since we had elected to allow users
to design their own cueblots we implemented a cueblot designer as
part of the registration process. We found that this resulted in users
spending considerable time designing their cueblot, inflating the
registration time (seconds) for the cueblot condition (M: 256.03,
SE: 71.364) so that it was much more time-consuming than pass-
word registration time (M: 44.88, SE: 8.68), t(52) = -2.729, p <
0.05. This can be viewed as a positive or negative effect depend-
ing on the reader’s point of view. It clearly makes the registration
more interactive, which is a good thing and is likely to lead to more
memorable passwords, but it does significantly increase registration
time.
Authentication
We continue our discussion of time by considering the mean time
(seconds) required to login for successful sessions. This measure-
ment was taken from user name entry until the login session was
completed and may also include more than one login attempt if they
were unsuccessful at first. We found that there was a significant dif-
ference between cueblots (M: 13.08, SE:0.532) and passwords (M:
11.15, SE:0.469), t(774) = -2.724, p < 0.05. This value includes
any additional time it would have taken for the user’s browser to
download and display the image representing the inkblot (gener-
ally less than 3KB in PNG format).
During the course of the experiment there were a total of 388
login sessions for cueblots and 412 login sessions for passwords.
Of these there were a significantly lower number of sessions with
a login failure for the cueblot condition (23) than for the password
condition (44), p < 0.05. This puts the mean number of failed
Figure 3: Choosing a Cueblot at Enrolment
sessions for passwords at 11% and cueblots at 6%.
However, when we look at the failed sessions in more detail we
discover that within a login attempt session the average number of
attempts at getting the password correct per session is somewhat
different. We found that there was an average of 1.18 attempts
(SE: 0.118) per session for a password while cueblots required an
average of 1.96 attempts (SE: 0.493). Our results indicate that there
was borderline significance (t(65) = -1.985, p = 0.051) which may
warrant further investigation. Thus cueblot users are more likely to
get it right first time but may make more attempts to login if they
fail the first time.
We also considered the number of sessions which were regarded
as “total failures” ie. sessions within which there was a failed login
attempt (or a sequence of failed login attempts) but no eventual
success indicating that the user gave up. We found that there was
no significant difference in this respect (3 failed cueblot sessions, 2
failed password sessions, p > 0.05).
8.4 Are Cueblots Efficacious Password Cues?
Efficacy metrics, as outlined in Section 4.3, are descriptiveness,
strength and durability. In terms of descriptiveness and strength,
these results appear to conflict with the results of our previous ex-
periment. The length of response decreased significantly once users
were asked to perform this task within a live authentication system,
and this impacts the strength of the password. Furthermore, pro-
vided textual descriptions were shorter and less descriptive, and,
indeed, some appeared to have nothing to do with the provided
cue, so the cueblot fails the descriptiveness test as well. This re-
sult strengthens findings by Brostoff et al. [55] during evaluation
of the Passfaces1 authentication mechanism where usage of an au-
1http://www.realuser.com
thentication system in real life differed significantly from lab-based
experimentation.
In our experiment it seems that when the user knows that the
cueblot description is going to be used frequently as a password, he
or she provides a much shorter description than would be provided
if the description was only going to be provided once or twice in a
lab-based experiment. This is perfectly reasonable, because users
emphasise convenience over security. Hence the length of response
and bits per char are basically the same as passwords. This is rather
disappointing since we had hoped that the presence of the cueblot
would allay users’ fears of forgetting their passwords and therefore
encourage them to choose longer (and stronger) passwords.
Finally, as regards durability, the cueblot users did appear to have
less trouble remembering their textual descriptions, although this
obviously does not apply to the four users who did not provide a
cueblot description, but rather provided a non-cued password.
When we first began our research into this area we believed that
users would embrace the ability to create longer passwords if they
were provided with a way to help them remember the password
more easily. Unfortunately this does not appear to be the case,
confirming the findings of Dhamija and Perrig [56] that people are
only willing to expend the minimum effort in managing their pass-
words. Our results indicate that the descriptions offered by users
are of comparable length and complexity to traditional passwords
but with the problem that they will tend to include common stop-
words in their description which weakens the password.
The general trend of using sub-optimal passwords accords well
with Payne’s [57] findings about how people conduct an implicit
cost-benefit analysis when making decisions and choices. Users of
passwords are clearly trading off the extra effort involved in typing
in long and complicated passwords as against the risk of having
an intruder break into their account. The risk is obviously not high
enough for them to put the extra effort in, to use longer and stronger
passwords.
9. CONCLUSION
We investigated the hypothesis that passwords could be cued by
using suitably chosen images. In Section 6 we found that textual
descriptions elicited by some of the images types did indeed show
some potential. In particular, we found that inkblot-type abstract
images elicited the longest and strongest textual descriptions. We
therefore decided to conduct a further experiment in order to test
the durability of these inkblot-type images.
However, in our final experiment, we found that the presence of
the cueblot did not have a positive effect on the users. It did not
appear to encourage them to strengthen their passwords and they
did not exploit the true potential of their cueblot in coming up with
a textual description thereof, probably because users anticipate the
extra effort involved in continuously entering the long description
at each authentication attempt with little enthusiasm.
We have to conclude that, whereas the cueblots were theoret-
ically viable in terms of cueing passwords, the end-user’s desire
for convenience and speed of access led them not to exploit the
potential for cueing provided by the cueblot. Perhaps the only con-
clusion is that the combination of convenience-seeking users and
passwords is doomed to failure. If this is the case then any auxil-
iary efforts to strengthen the mechanism, such as the one explored
in this paper, are futile.
However, there is are other contexts within which cueblots could
well be efficacious. For example, cueblots could be used instead
of the security questions that are currently used when users forget
their passwords. Their descriptions are held only by the system
itself, and therefore could not be discovered by judicious use of
the person’s social networking page or personal website [58]. Fur-
ther experiments will focus on the use of cueblots in other contexts,
since we believe that they do offer much potential due to their su-
perior descriptiveness and strength.
APPENDIX
A. IMAGES
A.1 Faces
The face images used in this study were collected from the Es-
sex University Computer Vision Facial Databases[47] “face94” and
“face95” and were chosen to represent an equal mix of male and
female faces with a range of physical features. Only images that
were clearly visible with similar scale and without distracting back-
grounds were considered.
Figure 4: Face
1 (Image 1)
Figure 5: Face
2 (Image 2)
Figure 6: Face
3 (Image 3)
Figure 7: Face
4 (Image 4)
Figure 8: Face
5 (Image 5)
Figure 9: Face
6 (Image 6)
A.2 Fractal
The Fractals were generated using a commercial program Ultra
Fractal[48]. Variations within the image class were obtained by
changing the algorithm used to generate the fractal in addition to
varying the viewing position and colouring algorithms.
Figure 10:
Fractal 1
(Image 7)
Figure 11:
Fractal 2
(Image 8)
Figure 12:
Fractal 3
(Image 9)
Figure 13:
Fractal 4
(Image 10)
Figure 14:
Fractal 5
(Image 11)
Figure 15:
Fractal 6
(Image 12)
A.3 Inkblots
The inkblots were generated by a custom PHP script. The inkblots
were built by dropping “blots” onto a canvas and ensuring the next
blot landed within a fixed area of the previous blot. The canvas was
then mirrored to create the final inkblot. The images were varied
by changing the values of variables which control the number of
blots, blot diameter, colour and distance between the blots.
Figure 16:
Inkblot 1
(Image 13)
Figure 17:
Inkblot 2
(Image 14)
Figure 18:
Inkblot 3
(Image 15)
Figure 19:
Inkblot 4
(Image 16)
Figure 20:
Inkblot 5
(Image 17)
Figure 21:
Inkblot 6
(Image 18)
A.4 Snowflakes
The Snowflake images were generated using A.I. Studio Snowflake
Generator[49] and variations within the images were achieved pri-
marily by varying the number and complexity of the rays along
with scaling and position details.
Figure 22:
Snowflake 1
(Image 19)
Figure 23:
Snowflake 2
(Image 20)
Figure 24:
Snowflake 3
(Image 21)
Figure 25:
Snowflake 4
(Image 22)
Figure 26:
Snowflake 5
(Image 23)
Figure 27:
Snowflake 6
(Image 24)
A.5 Textures
The Texture images were obtained from the CUReT[50] texture
database and were chosen to represent a range of different textures
including both man-made and natural textures.
Figure 28:
Texture 1
(Image 25)
Figure 29:
Texture 2
(Image 26)
Figure 30:
Texture 3
(Image 27)
Figure 31:
Texture 4
(Image 28)
Figure 32:
Texture 5
(Image 29)
Figure 33:
Texture 6
(Image 30)
B. REFERENCES
[1] R. J. Witty, K. Brittain, Automated password reset can cut IT
service desk costs, Gartner Report (2004).
[2] H. Ebbinghaus, Uber das Gedachtnis, Untersuchungen zue
experimentellen Psychologie, Wissenscaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, 1992, reprint from 1885.
[3] S. Gaw, E. W. Felten, Password management strategies for
online accounts, in: SOUPS ’06: Proceedings of the second
symposium on Usable privacy and security, ACM Press,
New York, NY, USA, 2006, pp. 44–55.
[4] D. L. Schacter, The Seven Sins of Memory. How the Mind
Forgets and Remembers, Houghton Mifflin Company, 2001.
[5] L. Nyberg, R. Habib, A. R. McIntosh, E. Tulving,
Reactivation of encoding-related brain activity during
memory retrieval, PNAS 97 (20) (2000) 11120–11124.
[6] M. Moscovitch, F. I. M. Craik, Depth of processing, retrieval
cues and uniqueness of encoding as factors in recall, Journal
of Learning and Verbal Behavior 15 (4) (1976) 447–458.
[7] M. Hertzum, Minimal-feedback hints for remembering
passwords, Interactions (2006) 38–40.
[8] A. Paivio, Mental representations: A dual coding approach,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1986.
[9] A. Stubblefield, D. Simon, Inkblot authentication, Tech. Rep.
MSR-TR-2004-85, Microsoft Research (August 2004).
[10] J. Podd, J. Bunnell, R. Henderson, Cost-effective computer
security: Cognitive and associative passwords, in: OZCHI
’96: Proceedings of the 6th Australian Conference on
Computer-Human Interaction (OZCHI ’96), IEEE Computer
Society, Washington, DC, USA, 1996, p. 304.
[11] J. Liddell, K. V. Renaud, A. De Angeli, Authenticating users
using a combination of sound and images, in: HCI 2003,
Bath, UK, 2003, short Paper.
[12] S. L. Smith, Authenticating users by word association, in:
G. Papp, R. Posch (Eds.), Proceedings of the Human Factors
Society 31st Annual Meeting, Wien, 1987, pp. 135–138.
[13] L. von Ahn, L. Dabbish, Labeling images with a computer
game, in: CHI ’04: Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference
on Human factors in computing systems, ACM Press, New
York, NY, USA, 2004, pp. 319–326.
[14] P. Jacob, M. Jeannerod, Ways of Seeing. The scope and
limits of visual cognition, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
UK, 2003.
[15] V. Bruce, P. R. Green, Visual Perception. Physiology,
Pschology and Ecology, Lawrence Erlbaum, Hove and
London, 1990.
[16] X. Alario, L. Ferrand, A set of 400 pictures standardised for
french: Norms for name agreement, image agreement,
familiarity, visual complexity, image variability and age of
acquisition, Behavior Research Methods, Instruments and
Computers 31 (1999) 531–552.
[17] H. D. Ellis, Theoretical aspects of face recognition, in:
G. Davies, H. Ellis, J. Shepherd (Eds.), Perceiving and
Remembering Faces, Academic Press, 1981, pp. 171–197.
[18] E. E. Smith, G. D. Nielsen, Representations and retrieval
processes in stm recognition and recall of faces, Journal of
Experimental Psychology 85 (3) (1970) 397–405.
[19] C. S. Dodson, M. K. Johnson, J. W. Schooler, The verbal
overshadowing effect: Why descriptions impair face
recognition, Memory & Cognition 25 (2) (1997) 129–139.
[20] G. H. Bower, M. B. Karlin, Depth of processing pictures of
faces and recognition memory, Journal of Experimental
Psychology 103 (4) (1974) 751–767.
[21] W. J. M. Levelt, P. Praamstra, A. S. Meyer, P. Helenius,
R. Salmelin, An MEG study of picture naming, Journal of
Cognitive Neuroscience 10 (5) (1998) 553–567.
[22] P. Bonin, M. Chalard, A. Me´ot, M. Fayol, The determinants
of spoken and written picture naming latencies, British
Journal of Psychology 93 (2002) 89–114.
[23] N. Geschwind, Problems in the anatomical understanding of
the aphasics, in: N. Geschwind (Ed.), Selected Papers on
Language and the Brain, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
Chicago: IL, 1974, Ch. XX, pp. 431–451.
[24] A. R. Luria, Traumatic Aphasia, Mouton, The Hague, 1970.
[25] G. Miceli, B. Benvegnu, R. Capasso, A. Caramazza, The
independence of phonological and orthographic forms:
Evidence from aphasia, Cognitive Neuropsychology 14
(1997) 35–69.
[26] B. Rapp, A. Caramazza, The modality specific organisation
of grammatical categories: Evidence from impaired spoken
and written sentence production, Brain and Language 56
(1997) 248–286.
[27] D. Rapaport, Diagnostic Psychological Testing, Vol. 2, Year
Book, Chicago, 1946.
[28] J. M. Gold, The role of verbalization in the rorschach
response process: A review, Journal of Personality
Assessment 51 (4) (1987) 489–505.
[29] B. Schneier, Real-world passwords,
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/12/
realworld_passw.html (Dec 2006).
[30] F. Tari, A. A. Ozok, S. H. Holden, A comparison of
perceived and real shoulder-surfing risks between
alphanumeric and graphical passwords, in: Symposium on
Usable Privacy and Security, Pittsburgh, 2006, pp. 56–66.
[31] D. B. Mitchell, A. S. Brown, Persistent repetition priming in
picture naming and its dissociation from recognition
memory, Journal of Experimental Psychology 14 (2) (1988)
213–222.
[32] S. Madigan, Picture memory, in: J. Yuille (Ed.), Imagery,
memory, and cognition: essays in honor of Allan Paivio,
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ, 1983, pp.
65–89.
[33] A. Paivio, Imagery and verbal processes, Holt, Rinheart &
Winston, New York, 1971.
[34] A. Paivio, T. Rogers, P. Smythe, Why are pictures easier to
recall than words?, Psychonomic Science 11 (4) (1968)
137–138.
[35] S. N. Singh, M. L. Rothschild, G. A. C. Jr, Recognition
versus recall as measures of television commercial
forgetting, Journal of Marketing Research 25 (1) (1988)
72–80.
[36] D. L. Nelson, V. S. Reed, J. R. Walling, Pictoral superiority
effect, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human
Learning and Memory 2 (5) (1977) 523–528.
[37] C. B. Cave, Very long-lasting priming in picture naming,
Psychological Science 8 (4) (1997) 322–325.
[38] C. M. MacLeod, Forgotten but not gone: Savings for pictures
and words in long-term memory, Journal of Experimental
Psychology 14 (2) (1988) 195–212.
[39] M. Wertheimer, D. Beardslee, Principles of perceptual
organization, Readings in Perception (1958) 115–135.
[40] N. Kanwisher, J. McDermott, M. M. Chun, The fusiform
face area: A module in the human extrastriate cortex
specialized for face perception, Journal of Neuroscience
17 (11) (1997) 4302–4311.
[41] J. M. Gold, A. B. Sekular, P. J. Bennett, Characterizing
perceptual learning with external noise, Cognitive Science 28
(2004) 167–207.
[42] J. Chance, A. G. Goldstein, Recognition of faces and verbal
labels, Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 7 (4) (1976)
384–6.
[43] G. Singh, Stringing the fractals, IEEE Computer Graphics &
Applications 25 (5) (2005) 4–5.
[44] H. Rorschach, Psychodiagnostics, Grune & Stratton, New
York, 1942, eds: P Lemkau and B Kronenberg, Original
published 1921.
[45] J. M. Wood, S. Lilienfeld, The rorschach inkblot test: A case
of overstatement?, Assessment 6 (1999) 341–349.
[46] A. G. Goldstein, J. E. Chance, Visual recognition memory
for complex configurations, Perception and Psychophysics
9 (2-B) (1970) 237–241.
[47] L. Spacek, Computer Vision Research Face Database (2006).
URL
http://cswww.essex.ac.uk/mv/allfaces/index.html
[48] F. Slijkerman, Ultra Fractal 4.02 (Standard Edition) (2005).
URL http://www.ultrafractal.com/
[49] A.I.Studio, Fractal Snowflake Generator (2004).
URL http://a-i-studio.com/snowflake/
[50] K. J. Dana, B. V. Ginneken, S. K. Nayar, J. J. Koenderink,
Columbia-Utrecht Reflectance and Texture Database (2005).
URL http://www1.cs.columbia.edu/CAVE/curet/
[51] C. Shannon, A mathematical theory of communication, Bell
System Technical Journal 27 (1948) 379–423 and 623–656.
[52] T. F. Smith, M. S. Waterman, Identification of Common
Molecular Subsequences, Journal of Molecular Biology 147
(1981) 195–197.
[53] R. M. Granovskaya, I. Y. Bereznaya, A. N. Grigorieva,
Perception of Form and Forms of Perception, Erlbaum,
Hillsdale, NJ, 1987.
[54] V. Kreinovich, L. Longpre´, Human visual perception and
kolmogorov complexity: Revisited, Bulletin of the European
Association for Theoretical Computer Science 64 (1998)
155–158.
[55] S. Brostoff, M. A. Sasse, Are passfaces more usable than
passwords?: A field trial investigation, in: Proceedings of
HCI 2000, 2000, pp. 405–424.
[56] R. Dhamija, A. Perrig, De´ja` vu: A user study using images
for authentication, in: Proceedings of USENIX Security
Symposium, Denver, Colorado, 2000, pp. 45–58.
[57] J. W. Payne, Contingent decision behavior, Psychological
Bulletin 92 (2) (1982) 382–402.
[58] A. Rabkin, Personal knowledge questions for fallback
authentication: Security questions in the era of facebook, in:
Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security. SOUPS 2008,
Pittsburgh, USA, 2008, pp. 13–23.
